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One of the most pressing problems in contemporary moral theory is that of
providing a correct account of the relationship between an agent’s having a norma-
tive reason to act (what she ought to do) and an agent’s being motivated to act
(what she actually does). Broadly speaking, there are three rival accounts of this
relationship on offer. Neo-Humeans (e.g. Michael Smith, Stephen Darwall,
Bernard Williams) argue that an agent has a normative reason to act if and only
if so doing would satisfy some desire of the agent; consequently, their task is to
show that there is an internal relation between an agent’s having a normative
reason to act and an agent’s having a desire to act. Kantians (e.g. Christine
Korsgaard, Thomas Nagel) argue that any agent who has a normative reason to
act, and who is practically rational (i.e. not  suffering from some debilitating form
of practical irrationality, such as weakness of will or depression), will act; conse-
quently, their task is to show that normative reasons always have overriding
authority and that it is always irrational not  to act upon them. Neo-A ristotelians
(e.g. John McDowell, Philippa Foot, David Brink) argue that normative reasons
for action are derived from facts about  human well-being, and that an agent will
be motivated to act provided that she has been habituated into having desires,
guided by reason, to act for her own well-being; consequently, their task is to
show how normative reasons can be derived from facts about human well-being
and whether it is always in an agent’s best interest to act morally.
A ll of the thirteen original essays in this collection, the majority of which were
presented at the E thics and Practical R eason Conference held by the Department
of Moral Philosophy at the University of St A ndrews in March 1995, are devoted
to some aspect of the problem of practical reason, and most of them side with
one of the three accounts described above. James Dreier defends the neo-Humean
position that ‘the only ultimate sort of reasons are instrumental reasons’ (p. 96),
although he does so by arguing that fellow neo-Humeans are wrong to claim that
there are no categorical imperatives, since there is one categorical imperative,
namely, the means/end principle of instrumental reason: ‘If you desire to ¥, and
believe that by ø-ing you will ¥, then you ought  to ø’ (p. 93) . His defence of the
categorical nature of this principle is similar both to Peter Railton’s argument that
there cannot  be a purely hypothe tical account of why we must conform to certain
forms of practical reason, and to David Velleman’s argument (against David
Gauthier) that our reasons for favour ing certain principles of practical reasoning
over others cannot  themselves be practical. Meanwhile Michael Smith argues, with
his customary optimism, that the neo-Humean dispositional theory of value can
provide a perfectly satisfactory account of human freedom and responsibility.
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Christine Korsgaard argues against Dreier and other neo-Humeans that they
are unable to provide an account of the normativity of the instrumental principle:
‘if you hold that the instrumental principle is the only principle of practical ration-
ality, you cannot  also hold that desiring something is a reason for pursuing it’ 
(p. 223) . Since the neo-Humean position rules out the possibility of practical reason
determining which ends ought to be pursued, it follows that an agent’s ends are
wholly determined by her desires. However, this means that the instrumental prin-
ciple must be reduced to something like: If you desire to ¥, and believe that by
ø-ing you will ¥, then you are going to ø. The principle cannot advocate that one
ought to ø on the basis of having a desire to ¥, since this would be to derive an
ought from an is. The only way to avoid this error, and to derive a reason for
acting from the principle, is to construe it as follows: If you have reason to ¥, and
believe that by ø-ing you will ¥, then you have reason to ø. But this means that
neo-H umeanism must be rejected, and that the instrumental principle must be
supplemented by another principle of practical reason, one that determines which
ends ought to be pursued. Korsgaard ultimately argues that the principle of prac-
tical reason required to support the normativity of the instrumental principle is
that ‘the adopt ion of an end is conceived as the person’s own free act’ (p. 234).
Korsgaard’s Kantian constructivism – the thesis that an action is good insofar as
it is the object of free rational choice – is in turn attacked by Berys Gaut in an essay
which seeks to undermine key elements of Kantian ethics in favour  of a neo-
Aristotelian position. Gaut  rst undermines the hoary article of faith that the only
thing which is good without quali cation is a good will (something which would
have us believe that there is nothing admirable in a clever thief ), advocating in its
stead a plurality of unconditional goods. He then argues that Kantian constructivism
gets the relationship between value and rationality backwards: ‘The proper criterion
for being rational here is the ability to recognise what it is good to do’ (p. 178), as
opposed to its being good to do whatever it is rational to do. Gaut argues that it is
a mistake to identify goodness with being the object of free rational choice, since
the notion of goodness is teleological and ‘for living beings the teleology is biolog-
ically categorised, linked to what ful ls the needs or advances the interests of a
living being – and not all living beings are rational (p. 178) . Joseph Raz, in an essay
entitled ‘The Amoralist’ which does not  quite live up to the promise of its title, also
criticizes the Kantian thesis that persons are to be valued in themselves tout court,
as opposed to being valued in themselves in virtue of their possessing various
natural qualities, while both David Brink and Jay Wallace argue against the Kantian
thesis that impartial moral obligations should always have overriding authority.
Finally Robert Audi places a plague on both the neo-Humean and Kantian houses
by undermining all attempts to  nd an internal relation between an agent’s having
a normative reason to act and her being motivated to act.
A lthough none of the three rival accounts emerges as the victor, each of these
essays, along with those by Terence Irwin, John Skorupski and Garrett Cullity,
makes a signi cant contribution to the debate over practical reason. Cullity and
Gaut are to be congratulated for putting together an extremely valuable collection.
Duke University James Edwin Mahon
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Marx: Justice and Dialectic
By James D aly
Greenwich Exchange, 1996. Pp. xiii + 144. ISBN l–871551–28–5. £7.95
(pbk).
Although appearing in a series called Philosophy Guides, this work is in many
respects as far from an introductory treatment of Marx’s thought  as one could
imagine. Not only is it a substantial contribution to recent debates about  the role
of justice in Marx’s thought, but  it also broadens the scope of those debates
markedly by setting Marx’s thought  in the context of the history of philosophy.
One way of understanding Daly’s distinctive approach is to see it as bringing
together and advancing two recent trends in Marx interpretation. One is the recent
discussion of Marx’s idea of justice (or his critique of ‘justice’) in analytical philos-
ophy; the other is the increasing recognition of Marx’s debt to Aristotle. Daly
argues for a broader historical approach to thinking about Marx on justice than
has been taken to date. Whilst the Aristotelianism of Marx has been demonstrated
by people like Scott Meikle and George McCarthy (and Allen Wood for every-
thing but  ethics/politics), until now no attempt has been made to look beyond
Aristotle himself. This work rightly stresses the fact that Marx’s debt to Aristotle
places his thought in relation not just to that of Aristotle, but  to the A ristotelian
tradition in general. Whilst its comparisons of Marx’s thought  to that of the natural
law tradition might initially appear strange, it has good grounds and is well argued
with a mastery of both that verges on being intimidating in its succinctness. As
well as relating Marx’s thought  to Aristotle’s followers, Daly also compares Marx
to Aristotle’s teacher Plato, again bringing connections to light which have to date
been generally missed or neglected.
In adopting an historical, rather than purely analytical, approach to Marx’s
thought, Daly stresses Marx’s rejection of forms of thinking characteristic of mod-
ernity; in particular, Marx’s rejection of both sides of the false opposition of
Kantianism and utilitarianism, and their attempted conjunction by R awls. In
arguing for the strong af nities of Marx’s approach to issues of justice with that
of the natural law tradition (broadly conceived to include Plato, A ristotle, the
Stoics and Aquinas), and its strong contrast with that of the modern natural right
tradition, Daly brings out the historical background to Marx’s concept of dialectic.
Unlike Kolakowski’s treatment of this background, which suffers from a lack of
completeness and absence of a sympathetic understanding, Daly’s rich knowledge
demonstrates that Marx’s rejection of Hegel’s idealism brings him back to older
traditions of dialectical thought which were critical in nature rather than mysti -
catory and justi catory as in H egel’s thought . Instead of presenting Marx 
as somehow combining German Idealism and English/French materialism, as 
most commentators do, D aly argues that Marx rejected both by developing a 
materialist conception of history which overcame the idealism/materialism split
characteristic of modern philosophy. Marx’s materialism, thus understood, is not
materialist in the sense of reducing things to atoms colliding in the void, but rather
anti-reductionist in seeing things, including human beings, in basically Aristotelian
terms as possessing a nature or essence whose potential can be realized or thwarted
in speci c societies to varying degrees. It is this emphasis on human nature as
providing the critical standard by which all societies may be judged which is the
means to avoiding the aporia of relativism. Whilst ‘moralities’ emerge from soci-
eties and are laden with the power relationships of their origin, such an Aristotelian
conception of the good based in an understanding of human nature as transcending
any particular society enables Marx both to reject modern (bourgeois) accounts
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of the content of justice and to articulate a different conception without himself
falling into the trap of relativizing his own conception to a particular society.
Such a view of justice goes against any view of Marx as holding to a vulgar
progressivist, or Plekhanovite, view of history. There is no unilinear ascent from
the past to the present, but rather an ever open potential within human beings
for shaping social relations into forms which are more adequate to human nature.
This transhistorical idea of justice is thus not  something which  oats free of the
world of nature, alone in a realm of it own; rather it is grounded in our most
basic needs and concerns as human beings, albeit distorted by class.
One topic which perhaps needs explication at greater length is the connection
between Marx’s use of the concept of human nature and his critique of H egel. It
is unclear to me to what extent Marx can both validly reject class-distorted concep-
tions of human nature and claim a special status for his (i.e. the proletariat’s)
conception. Rousseau seems to have been aware that in criticizing Hobbes and
Locke for referring to ‘natural man’ yet describing ‘(un)social man’, objections of
the same form could be cast back at him. It seems to me that a similar problem
reproduces itself in any attempt to assimilate Marx’s materialist conception of
history to an Aristotelian position in ethics. If Marx, following Feuerbach, is 
going to reject Hegel on the grounds that his philosophy makes use of abstrac-
tions invalidly generalized from empirical reality, then his position, as interpreted
by Daly, is surely open to a similar objection: that Marx’s concept of human nature
is itself an abstraction of the kind he sought  to avoid. The seemingly paradoxical
nature of the proletariat as being both a particular class within capitalism and the
universal class is the key to Daly’s answer to such objections.
However, this idea requires to be spelled out  in greater detail. The realism of
Daly’s position with respect to essences needs a more substantial defence in this
context; but this is really a minor caveat, given that Marx himself never explained
his epistemological commitments in the depth that is necessary.
University of Ulster Colin M. Harper
L e monolinguism e de l’autre ou la prothèse d’origine
By Jacques D errida
Galilée, 1996. Pp. 137. ISBN 2–7 186–0474–3. 140 f.
Derrida  rst read a shorter and somewhat different version of Monolinguism e at
the conference organized by Edouard Glissant and David Wills (23–5 April 1992)
at the Louisiana State University, under the title: ‘Echoes from Elsewhere/Renvoi
d’ailleurs’. To de ne the status and the purpose of the text, we could use classical
and apparently evident criteria, and assign the text a place between the autobio-
graphical genre and a kind of phenomenological description of the general
conditions of constitution of the ego. Taking his own case as an illustration of a
general re ection on the transcendental conditions of autobiography, Jacques
Derrida seems to use this theoretical consideration as a pretext for an autobio-
graphical narration. But the reverse is also true. This autobiographical report, 
in so far as it is exemplary, offers itself as an allegory of the relation of man 
to language in general. This reversibility is the effect of a complicated structure
which Derrida names ‘exemplarité de remarque’, and which renders those distinc-
tions inappropriate. As Derrida reminds us in the epilogue: ‘Ce que j’ébauche 
ici, ce n’est surtout pas le commencement d’une esquisse d’autobiographie ou
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d’anamnèse, pas même un timide essai de Bildungsrom an intellectuel. Plutôt que
de l’exposition de moi, ce serait l’exposé de ce qui aura fait obstacle, pour moi,
à cette auto-exposition. De ce qui m’aura exposé, donc, à cet obstacle, et jeté
contre lui’ (p. 131). A ll things considered, the main purpose of this text is a rigorous
exposition, a scrupulous report of a complication which hinders any plain and
peaceful self-reference and self-exhibition – whether in the empirical mode of an
autobiographical account of an individual and contingent curriculum or in that of
a transcendental or ontological description of a universal structure and genesis of
the ego (Husserl) or of the ipse (Heidegger). And this complication has some-
thing to do with that relation to language which Derrida calls ‘monolinguism’.
Yet, even if it renders inadequate the distinction between reference to an em-
pirical ‘I’ situated and determined historically, geographically, sociologically, etc.,
and reference to a universal structure of subjectivity, this distinction remains
nonetheless a necessary – but not suf cient – condition to understand the uncanny
(unheimlich) logic of this exhibition (D arstellung), of this demonstration (taken
both in its logical and its political sense). A s it is the case for everything Derrida
has written so far, this demonstration is carried out and forth by the movement
of a strange ‘retro-hetero-reference’ (sic) to something which is neither transcen-
dent nor immanent – but  elsewhere. This movement is, as such, an exaggeration
and a complication of the Rückbez iehung characteristic of Husserl’s transcenden-
tal phenomenology (see Ideen . . . I, § 65) . If, on the one hand, ‘tout [ce qui 
a interessé J. Derrida] n’a pas pu ne pas procéder de cette étrange référence 
à un “ailleurs” dont  le lieu et la langue [lui] étaient à [lui-même] inconnus ou
interdits’ (p. 131) , on the other hand, nothing could be explained without a ‘judéo-
franco-maghrébine’ genealogy (p. 133). This twisted reference folds up and again
marks and remarks a universal structure on the singular body of a witness. Such
is the reality itself of this hyperphenomenology. Such is the thing of this phenom-
enologist struck by an ‘hyperbolite incurable’ (p. 81), who carries phenom-
enological uprightness (honesty) with respect to this thing and body up to the
point  of exaggeration, of presumptuousness of seeing itself as it is and telling
himself as it sees himself – i.e. as exemplary.
This self-exposition takes the form of a ‘demonstration’ and one must under-
stand this word as denoting not  only a logical inference, but also the kind of
political event in which one shows one’s force and one’s grievance. The demon-
strandum is a liminary statement: I speak  only one language, and it is not mine
(‘Je n’ai qu’une langue, ce n’est pas la mienne’ (p. 13)). This statement is put
forward not  exactly as an assum ption, not even as a supposition, but  rather as a
 ction. And it is, on the spot, generalized and increased into the form of a conjunc-
tion of two universal propositions: ‘On ne parle jamais qu’une seule langue – ou
plutôt un seul idiome’ and ‘O n ne parle jamais une seule langue – ou plutôt il
n’y a pas d’idiome pur’ (p. 23) . This statement seems obviously contradictory, from
a logical and from a pragmatic point of view (p. 15) , yet its generalization intro-
duces us into the edge of the argument (‘le nerf de l’argumentation’): the
exemplariness of a testimony. This structure of exemplariness represents the heart
of Derrida’s argument. As we know (at least since Hume’s Enquiry Concerning
Hum an Understanding, Section X, On Miracles), the credibility of a testimony
testifying to such a case of monolinguism presupposes the possibility of what is
testi ed; and, vice versa, the veri cation of such a possibility implies the eventual
exhibition of an example. It implies the event of a case of ‘monoliguisme de l’autre’.
For Derrida these are two different ways of circumscribing the same circle. One
is the Socratic-Platonic way, in which the intuition or the de nition of the essence
must precede the mention of any example. A nd the other is the ‘A ristotelian’ way,
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on the authority of which Derrida seems to act, and following which the intuition
of a case precedes, conditions (as p r o ¢ t e r o n  p r o z  h ’ m a V ) and guides the clearing
out and the deciphering of any universal structure (p. 27). Yet an example 
(a ‘case’) imposes itself on Derrida’s attention, that of a little (French) Algerian
Jew arrived in France at the age of 19, who has been forced into the position of
testifying (as under coercion) to an uncanny monolinguism. It is the double bind
of a double ban , so to speak: the  rst is a tacit interdiction concerning the 
use and the learning of the neighbour’s and autochton’s languages (Arabic and
Berber), and second is the impossibility of appropriation of and self-identi cation
with the dominant and colonial language. Derrida gives two reasons of this impos-
sibility: for French-A lgerians in general, France was the ‘métropole’, and the French
language was the language spoken outre-mer; but  more accurately, French Jews
were new, vulnerable and exposed citizens (‘assimilated’ in October 1870 and
deprived of French citizenship in October 1940, they were re-assimilated (!) in
1943). From a psycho-pathological point of view, one could consider Derrida’s as
an exceptional ‘case’ of identity trouble. But it is also – and rather – a cultural,
sociological and political one. Derrida endeavours to show that this exception is
exemplary of all singular situations – except for the suffering which falls to each
singular case. Exemplariness means that it reveals, indicates, and gives to read
‘plus à vif et mieux que d’autres’ (p. 41)  the main features of a universal struc-
ture of ‘linguistical solipsism’. Derrida’s case will have been sui generis and more
exemplary than any other. This is the incredible thing, and thus the thing one can
only believe.
Thus are displayed the threads – or the plot – of this strange demonstration,
which give it its irrepressible course and its necessity. By enforcing and simpli-
fying its didactic scheme, we could obtain the following logical sequence: (1)
assumption of an hypothesis determining what must be the choice of a good
example (Chapter 3), (2) mention of the example, assimilated to a subpoena of
witness (Chapter 4), (3) explication of the status and the full – i.e. political – signif-
icance of this example (Chapters 5–6), (5) exposition and report of this example
structured as a story and its inscription into the context of ‘generality circles’ (p.
71)  (French-Algerian in the broad sense of the term, and French-Algerian Jews),
(Chapters 6–7), (6) corroboration of the possibility of a monolinguism without
any own language, without any mother tongue and corroboration of the fact that
this testi ed possibility is revealing of a universal structure concerning every linguis-
tical situation (Chapters 7–8).
But such enforcement and simpli cation would put aside what is essential in
this essay, i.e. its writing that must be distinguished more than ever from any
literary or rhetorical concept of ‘style’ – if we want to read Derrida. Such assim-
ilation would only follow in the footsteps of – or forestall – the words of the
Attorney General of sound philosophy, who threatens on p. 18: “Si vous continuez,
on vous mettra dans un département de rhétorique ou de littérature’. Writing
corresponds by no means to what a purist would understand by bon goº t, i.e.
grammatical and stylistic correctness. This term denotes the same thing as that of
‘uncanny reference’. A nd as the uncanny reference to one’s language, it gives this
demonstration its purpose and shape. This writing gives way (and voice) to a
rigorous and almost ascetic exercise of responsibility. A ccording to D errida,
responsibility is the scrupulous obedience to a more imperative and ‘secret rule’
(p. 79)  than what one usually understands by grammatical correctness, than what
one understands as understanding and speaking good French and following sound
logic. Writing as ‘mode d’appropriation aimante et désespérée de la langue’ 
(p. 59), as ‘inscription de soi dans la langue défendue’ (p. 60), refers consequently
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to a political strategy and to a certain political culture concerning language. As
any politics, it is against something. In this case, against a certain complicity
between philosophical and political attitudes with regard to language. Language
is supposed to be governed by certain rules according to which one can determine
the conditions of communicability. Derrida detects behind those apparently
descriptive statements a series of performative speech acts. Any attempt to objec-
tivize language – to dominate it theoretically and practically – is the symptom of
a compulsion and a phantasm. In his own way, Derrida is to a certain extent moti-
vated by this compulsion. For writing in the Derridian sense intends that ‘quelque
chose arrive à cette langue’, that something happens to it, affects it so intimately
that it be no more ‘en position de protester sans devoir protester du même coup
contre sa propre émanation . . . qu’elle en vienne à jouir comme d’elle-même,
comme l’Un qui se retourne, qui s’en retourne chez lui, au moment où un hôte
incompréhensible, un arrivant sans origine assignable la ferait arriver à lui, ladite
langue, l’obligeant alors à parler, elle-même, la langue, dans sa langue, autrement.
Parler toute seule. Mais pour  lui et selon lui, gardant en son corps, elle, l’archive
ineffaçable de cet événement’ (p. 85).
Deconstructionist writing appears as the hyperphenom enology of this
messianism , of this ‘structure immanente de promesse ou de désir’, of this ‘attente
sans horizon d’attente [qui] informe toute parole’ (p. 42) . It is also described as
a structure of alienation without alienation (sic), without any former appropria-
tion and propriety. The idea of an appropriateness concerning the use of language
is the upper structure of this substructure. It institutes the ‘phénomène du s’en-
tendre-parler pour vouloir-dire’, the ‘phénomène comme phantasme’ (p. 48). It
fosters and deters any desire of mastery – it exacerbates it. The feat of strength
of any ‘master’ consists in leading one to believe that he does have a language,
that he does know what speaking means and consequently in what kind of discourse
thought can be properly expressed, in presenting himself as the beholder 
and defender of a cultural and linguistic identity. We could  nd this archi-
performative speech act at the groundless ground of every institution and authority.
Taken in this sense, Derridian writing has a testimonial and exemplary dimen-
sion. And Derrida himself appears as the ‘héros-martyr-pionnier-législateur-
hors-la-loi’ (sic) of this strange law and even as an ironical prophet carried along
by his own prophecy (p. 61). For this structure is the same as that which Derrida
names ‘exemplarité de re-marque’ – as opposed to the instantiation of an exam-
ple in a series. Derrida notices (p. 49) that even in its classical treatment, this
problem is already unfathomable. But it receives here an additional condition 
(‘un pli supplémentaire’) so that it becomes inappropriate for any self-identi cation
or self-glori cation.
This experience of an hospitable and jealous language is the quasi-
transcendental condition of articulation between universality and singularity (‘la
singularité exemplaire ou témoignante de existence martyrisée’) (p. 50). Language
is not  a habit or an habitus among others, or something one could peacefully
inhabit; it makes of who wants to have it its ‘host’ and ‘hostage’. This entails a
certain number of complications and consequences not only with regard to auto-
biographical writing, but also with respect to metalogical pretensions of
philosophical or theological discourse. A pparently, all philosophers of language,
especially in the analytical tradition, would accept this thesis. We  nd both argu-
ments in Wittgenstein. It is less evident that they would accept the hypothesis that
this archi-determining relation to language should be of a solipsistic kind. Is it not
another way of reintroducing the mythology of a ‘private language’? In my view,
this objection stands only as far as we continue to consider philosophy and logical
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clarity in philosophy with what phenomenology calls a natural attitude. For the
phenomenological tradition, this hypothesis is not absurd. Even in Husserl’s
phenomenology, there is that requirement of a ‘transcendental logos’ which,
according to the ‘natural attitude’ must appear, inevitably, as pure nonsense. And
from the genetic and constitutive point of view, the intersubjective habitus of a
language in general is a transcendental condition of the inhabiting of a common
world – which in the  rst stage is not the ‘universe’ of science. But Husserl’s
phenomenology is carried along by the movement of the Rückbez iehung and forced
to take into account the historical determining conditions of this constitution. This
is how Husserl is led, in his later works, to the question of historical inscription
and accomplishment of the general performances (L eistungen) of transcendental
subjectivity, and thus, to that of the singular and historical language in which and
with which the ego breaks from its solipsistic sphere to come to the light of commu-
nication. Derrida is in a way a turbulent son of this tradition. Like Husserl and
Descartes, he assumes and suffers from the same ‘hyperbolite’. Like them, he is
convinced that there is a philosophical courage which consists in pushing ratio-
nality to the ‘point  de folie et de mort’ which represents the highest danger for
philosophy and reason (cf. the discussion with Fouccault concerning D escartes’s
‘argument de la folie’, in 1963) . For this reason, Derrida’s thought can be described
as hyperphenomenological.
Université de Caen, France Carlos L obo
Equality in Com m unity: Sexual Equality in the Writings of William
T hompson and A nna D oyle W heeler
By D olores Dooley
Cork University Press, 1996. Pp. 448. ISBN 1–85918–004–3 (hbk),
1–85918–005–1 (pbk) . £40.00.
This scholarly and impressive book, which brings together biographical, historical
and philosophical themes, is an attempt to render the invisible visible. Dolores
Dooley begins with a question: why is William Thompson’s A ppeal not included
in the canon of feminist writings? Published in 1825, between Mary
Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Wom an (1792) and John Stuart Mill’s
Subjection of Wom en (1869), the A ppeal is a radical text which, Dooley notes,
presents the ‘rudiments of a socialist feminist position’ (p. xiii). It covers themes
which were important in its day, and which remain central to feminist thinking
now. Indeed, its radicalism anticipates many strands of modern feminist thinking
and, in this sense, it is more ‘advanced’ than either Mill’s Subjection or
Wollstonecraft’s Vindication . Yet the book has been largely ignored by feminists,
who move seamlessly from Wollstonecraft to Mill, giving no hint of the existence
of anything in between. Dooley’s  rst task, therefore, is to explain this puzzle and
to defend the A ppeal as worthy of a place in the canon.
However, this is not  the only form of invisibility which requires explanation.
Nested within the invisibility of the A ppeal itself are two further exemplars of
invisibility: the invisibility of Thompson’s intellectual and life partner, Anna Doyle
Wheeler, and the invisibility of women generally in nineteenth-century political
life and letters. Dooley opens her book with two chapters documenting the lives
of William Thompson and A nna Doyle Wheeler. Her aim here is not  simply to
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provide an historical context for the A ppeal, but also to justify the contention that
Wheeler was more than simply a muse to Thompson. Rather, she made a distinc-
tive contribution to the A ppeal and to the realization of its political aims via her
emphasis on ‘emotional negotiation’ and her practical attempts to liaise between
the Owenites in Britain and the Four ierists and Saint-Simonians in France.
Philosophically, she shared Thompson’s commitment to the greatest happiness
principle, but she also saw the practical necessity of persuading people to focus
on that ‘unifying’ aim in spite of their smaller disagreements. Her emotional nego-
tiation work was therefore both a contribution to the political project and a warning
against excessive abstraction in philosophy.
Moreover, the need to retrieve the story of Anna Doyle Wheeler is a speci c
case of the more general need to render nineteenth-century women visible. Thus,
the A ppeal draws attention to the various ways in which women are ‘written out’
of political life, and it challenges those who do this to justify their stance and show
how it can be consistent with their wider philosophical theories. Chief amongst
the targets of the A ppeal is James Mill, whose Essay on Government insisted: ‘One
thing is pretty clear, that all those individuals whose interests are indisputably
included in those of other individuals may be struck off without inconvenience’ 
(as quoted, p. 127). This is what Dooley refers to as a case of ‘pseudo-inclusion’.
Mill supposes that women are included in his political theory because he supposes
that women share an identity of interests with their husbands or fathers. However,
the identity of interests thesis is a  ction, and the exclusion of women to which
it leads is a betrayal of utilitarianism itself. As Dooley amply demonstrates, the
gauntlet which is cast down by the A ppeal is one which calls upon utilitarians to
take seriously their own commitment to the pursuit of happiness and to acknowl-
edge that that project requires the inclusion of women in political life. She notes:
‘it is a compelling part of the argument of the A ppeal that by continuing to exclude
women from liberty, equality, and access to all the means to choose their happi-
ness, men were failing to see clearly their own possibilities for happiness’ (p. 136) .
The very principle of utility which informed James Mill’s writing was also, and at
the same time, a principle which should led him to endorse the extension of the
rights of man to woman.
There is, however, a twist in the tail of this argument. Notoriously, truth and
utility do not always combine harmoniously, and there can therefore be cases in
which the promotion of the greatest happiness requires a certain economy with
the truth. Dooley is alert to this dif culty, and she invokes it both as a partial
explanation for the invisibility of the A ppeal and as a partial explanation for the
exclusion of women in nineteenth-century utilitarian thinking. Thus she notes that
it was ‘politically inexpedient for co-operators to adopt wholeheartedly the
critiques of the A ppeal’ (p. 138), and singles out  Jeremy Bentham as someone
who should, in consistency, have been far more vociferous than he was in response
to Mill’s Essay. She speculates that ‘Bentham may have decided to maintain some
unity among the circle of Political Radicals, to focus on expanding the suffrage
for men but to allow the extension to women to wait – for almost another century’
(p. 133). Ironically, the principle of utility could be used in more than one way:
it certainly exposed the illegitimacy of refusing political and legal rights to women,
but  it could also be deployed to condone political quiescence in the face of injus-
tice. It was also a signi cant factor in the neglect of the A ppeal itself, which was
too radical for the political moment at which it appeared.
Throughout  the book Dooley shows care in locating the diverse sites of
invisibility, and sensitivity in discussing the reasons for it. Her chapter on ‘Sites
of Oppression’ is a strikingly nuanced account of the multiple ways in which
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nineteenth-century women might suffer oppression, and Dooley is at pains to point
out  that the A ppeal itself does not adopt a simple model of oppression according
to which ‘men  ourish and women languish’ (p. 181). On the contrary, it is a deep
and dif cult fact that women are often rendered incapable of recognizing their
own oppression, and it is an equally troubling fact that men too fail to realize
how much they lose by having, as a wife, a more or less willing slave. It is not
only the A ppeal and the political oppression of women which are invisible, but
also the psychic damage which is done to both men and women by political struc-
tures which perpetuate inequality and deny liberty to one half of the human race.
Dooley’s book constitutes a very signi cant contribution to feminist history, to
intellectual biography, and to moral and political philosophy. William Thompson’s
A ppeal is set in its historical context, and it is shown how that context in uenced
the reception of allegedly ‘universal’ philosophical arguments. What we must
conclude is that philosophical arguments do not  persuade merely in virtue of being
true, and that what constitutes the canon is dictated as much by fortune and polit-
ical convenience as by argumentative power. This conclusion is an important one
for feminist theory in particular, and also for moral and political philosophy gener-
ally. Feminists, historians and philosophers all have reason to be grateful to Dolores
Dooley for retrieving an important work which has for too long been consigned
to the dustbin of history.
University of York Susan Mendus
Prem ises: Essays on Philosophy and L iterature from  K ant to Celan
By Werner Hamacher, translated by Peter Fenves
Cambridge, MA: H arvard University Press, 1996. Pp. 393. ISBN
0–674–70073–2. £36.50.
It is dif cult to write on philosophy and literature without being thick or simple.
This collection of essays by Werner Hamacher does not prove otherwise. Since
Hegel vowed to make philosophy speak German and, in spite of that, was trans-
lated into many languages – to the universal detriment of philosophy, if not  of
German – there have been regular recurrences of the thick disease, some
(Heidegger) nearly as rampant as Hegel in his high season, others (Hamacher,
one might hope) less infectious if no less . . . thick. While the subtitle’s reference
to Kant and Celan promises well to avoid Teutonic barbarism, Hamacher 
really begins with Hegel, from which he goes back to Kant, and underwrites the
whole with references to Fichte and Heidegger wherever Hegel is sublated. It is
extremely dif cult for one who does not share his tailors to come to an under-
standing of the man. I am not  sure, however, that this is a problem, or even a
possibility, on Hamacher’s account. Consider:
‘Authentic interpretation’ makes a demand – it is imperative – on every text,
whether this text be nature or the world, and the demand is: act in language,
or in speech, so that there could be a homogeneous continuum of under-
standing, comprehension, and agreement – and thus a universal language.
It demands that an interpretation should be possible. Since, however, it is
merely the imperative of this interpretation, it also contains the following
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concession: such an interpretation has not yet come into being, and under
the conditions of  nitude it never can and never will.
(p. 89)
This will not, then, have been a review of Premises.
I am not sure what we should make of a book which begins (as many in our
overly epistemological age might) ‘Understanding is in want of understanding’,
but  then goes on to explicate its opening thus:
That understanding is in want of understanding – a proposition 
to be read as the principle of understanding, as an announcement or summa-
tion, as a demand or complaint – will not  have said anything about
understanding unless it itself is understood, and unless it is understood that
this proposition speaks also of the impossibility of understanding and thus
the impossibility of this very proposition.
(p. 1)
Perhaps there is something here which I do not  understand; but even to phrase
this possibility requires the grammatically induced presumptions that there is 
a subject, an object and a relation (or misrelation), rather than that reading is
‘sheer relation without  relata’ (p. 135) . Perhaps my view of this book is false where
it is not blank, but such a complaint should be questioned (if, in fact, it can even
be raised), for hermeneutics ‘cannot construct a theory of truth as correspondence
but must set out the conditions of possibility for, the genesis of, and the impera-
tive demand for such a truth. . . . A n interpretation can be said to correspond 
to the interpretandum or not to do so only if this interpretandum has a reality
independent of every possible interpretation’ (p. 137). This condition is known
not to hold. The conditions for the possibility of such a demand could not  be
evaluated should any hermeneutic ever supply them, for to be able to eval-
uate the truth-value of those conditions would always already have presumed an
answer to a question which arises after the question which hermeneutics has only
now opened is answered. The question of truth has become a Capuchin; it is
permanently begging.
Perhaps, on the other hand, this book is meant as the reductio ad absurdum  of
post-Kantian G erman philosophy; in that case, everything is in order.
No doubt  I have exposed myself. It is not only poetry which no longer imposes
itself, but exposes itself (pp. 43, 379) . But since interpretation just is exposition,
Professor Hamacher will not be displeased – or even disagree with my exposition.
For truth ‘is not “correctness” – for it does not consist in the correspondence
between given entities – and hermeneutics is not  the “art of correctly understanding
another’s discourse”, as Schleiermacher de nes it. Hermeneutics is the releasing,
the setting free, of “another’s discourse”, and being itself discourse in its alter-
ation, it is ana- and allo-hermeneutics’ (p. 142, Hamacher’s italic). That this
undecidable question, this dilemma – this quaking between incapacity and absurd-
ity – should be the body of my review is a mimesis of the deep structure of modern
and post-modern philosophy of literature.
Where for Kant the noumenal began as a theoretical limit, in the movement
of German philosophy through Nietzsche, for whom
designation phenomenalizes individual differences into something shown. 
It generalizes its communication in accordance with an economy of
representability that is foreign to the unconditionally individual. The
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‘phenomenalism and perspectivism’ of ‘communicative signs’ – of the ‘mark-
ings of the herd’ – rest on the systematic restriction of difference and on a
morphologizing of what has neither shape nor self, neither substance nor
subject. Consciousness, even the most ‘individual’ is a mask
(p. 175, quot ing Neitzsche)
the individual, will, life, death, everything becomes a thing in itself. ‘This “phenom-
enalism” of consciousness and language is irreducible’ (p. 175); the Capuchin truth
makes its rounds in cities of nominalist preachers exchanging greetings of mutual
anathema. Thankfully, they are mutually meaningless as well. Knowledge is not,
interpretation is not  of, and the question of truth is merely an echo of grammat-
ical form re ecting off the cave-wall of language, beyond which we can not even
imagine.
It is possible that where Professor Hamacher wants to go in writing, and where
he wishes us to go in reading his book, is a good place, the right place, the place
where we in fact are though we do not  recognize it, for that philosophy – as poetry
– exposes and constructs its understanding even as it seeks to understand is un-
deniable. But the conditioned freedom of our knowledge and willing, writing and
interpreting is not  ‘helpless’ (p. 295), and it does not require us to draw the conclu-
sion that since ‘it is no longer clear what is absent, what is lost, and what has
missed the mark, then all talk of absence, losing and missing the mark is not  only
hypothe tical, it misses the mark in principle’ (p. 296)  – or even agree with the
premises. But even if all that he exposes in those sentences is so – whatever that
could mean – his writing is the wrong writing to take us to the place of mutual
understanding between poetry and philosophy, or to show the place to us. It is
too philosophical, not poetic enough; it suffers from the form of philosophy – and
German philosophy in particular – rather than suffering the shaping of poetry.
The fact that it is a collection of disparate essays emphasizes this point , for while 
the essays are thematically linked (linked in the way of philosophy), 
they were not  meant each part for the other; they are not poetically 
self-conforming or lyrically formed. I would agree that the place where philos-
ophy and literature meet is a point of genuine uni cation; ‘critique [should] itself
be the poetry that it [seeks] to analyze; poetry [should] be the prose of thought’
(p. 228). That is not  accomplished here, nor is it even under way (cf. p. 229) ; it is
announced as a desideratum, and spoken of as an abandoned child.
University of Nebraska–Kearney Gene Fendt
Brute Science: Dilemm as of A nimal Experimentation
By H ugh LaFollette and Niall Shanks
Routledge, 1996. Pp. 286. ISBN 0–415–13113–8 (hbk) . £45.00. ISBN
0–415–13114–6 (pbk) . £13.99.
There are three stages in the testing of new clinical drugs (and vaccines). At  rst
research is done in the laboratory using computers, test-tube experiments, and 
the like. Drugs that pass this stage are tested on animals, and those which are
successful here are then taken to clinical trials with human volunteers. It follows
that if the animal stage is to be bypassed, then alternatives to animal testing must
be found.
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However, if the present three-stage experimental system is perfectly adequate,
then why should we search for an alternative? The short answer to this question
is that it would prevent animal suffering and death, both of which occur on a vast
scale in the interests of medical research.
The moral issue of animal testing has long seemed an intractable one. Those
who defend the practice use the following range of arguments: (a) the argument
from human welfare; (b) the argument from the experimental necessity of using
animals; (c) the argument from the superior status of humans; (d) the argument
from the strictness of regulatory procedures; (e) the argument from legal obliga-
tions; (f) the argument from the exclusivity of rights; and (g) the argument from
human participation.
Those who oppose animal testing use the following range of arguments: (a) the
argument from intolerable cruelty; (b) the argument against the experimental
necessity claim; (c) the argument from triviality; (d) the argument against the
success claims of the researchers; (e) the argument from grievous experimental
error; (f) the argument from dissimilarities between humans and animals; (g) the
argument from alternative techniques; (h) the argument from pharmaceutical
excess; (i) the argument from animals’ equal capacity for suffering; (j) the argu-
ment from animal rights.
In Brute Science, LaFollette and Shanks devote some two hundred pages to one
segment of this debate, that concerning the scienti c legitimacy of animal exper-
imentation. This is because ‘there are scienti c questions about  the validity of
animal experimentation that both sides of this debate should consider seriously’
(pp. vii, viii). In particular, they maintain, ‘Doubts about  the grand claims made
for animal experimentation emerge from a careful examination of evolutionary
biology’ (p. viii).
The central scienti c question is whether ‘the  ndings in animals are cau-
sally relevant to biomedical conditions in humans’ (p. 22) . It is reasonable to doubt
that the  ndings in animals are causally relevant, they contend, because of dif-
ferences in anatomy and physiology, because of differences in the aetiology 
of disease (‘most diseases and conditions in laboratory animals are arti -
cially induced’), and because of the different sources and extent of the stress 
experienced by laboratory animals.
That there is good reason to doubt the causal relevance of  ndings in animals
is con rmed, according to LaFollette and Shanks, by the testing of drugs in animals:
‘Less than one out of four potential drugs that successfully negotiate initial animal
tests are ever approved by the Food and Drug A dministration . . . if we give the
most generous interpretation of the data, of those drugs that successfully completed
animal trials and began clinical trials, 47 percent are discontinued because the
drugs are later deemed unsafe or inef cacious in humans (FDA  1988)’ (p. 28) .
From this evidence LaFollette and Shanks conclude that ‘of those drugs that are
safe and ef cacious in animals, the animal trials are no better than 50 percent
accurate in determining a drug’s safety and ef cacy’ (p. 28).
I’m afraid I do not see the problem here. What LaFollette and Shanks are
talking about represents just a section of the screening process for a new drug.
To begin with, scientists learn a great deal about a potential new drug from
computer graphics and test-tube experiments. Drugs that pass this stage are then
tested on animals. Drugs that pass this stage are then tested on humans. Each
year, between 10,000 and 15,000 people in Britain take part in Phase-One trials
(tests on healthy volunteers to check for side-effects of drugs). In Phase-Two trials,
the compound is tested on between 100 and 200 patients who have the condition
the drug has been developed to treat. Finally, in Phase-Three trials, thousands of
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patients take the medicine, under supervision, to test its ef cacy. Clearly, there is
an extensive, and intensive, screening and weeding out  process involved. By the
time the latest drug for depression or hypertension, gets to me, it is very safe, and
very effective.
LaFollette and Shanks maintain that ‘The presence of causal disanalogies under-
mines the claim that animal research is of immediate and direct relevance to
human biomedical phenomena’ (pp. 107, 108). Researchers themselves, they add,
‘claim controlled laboratory experiments on animals are the core of scienti c medi-
cine’ (p. 109). In particular, researchers assume that inferences from non-human
Causal Analog Models (CAMs) to humans ‘exhibit normal causal reasoning’ (p.
110). But they don’t. In deterministic and probabilist methodologies ‘experimenters
make inferences from what happens to Xs in the lab to what will happen to Xs
outside the lab. Not so with animal experiments. Here researchers make predic-
tions from what happens to Xs (some non-human CAM) in the lab to what will
happen to Ys (humans) outside the lab. This cannot be straightforward causal
reasoning, not even probabilistic causal reasoning’ (p. 110) .
I hope that these quotations give some picture of the LaFollette and Shanks
approach to the issue of animal research. Their thesis that we cannot be con -
dent about  extrapolating from results in animals to results in humans because
(ironically) of ‘evolved disanalogy in biological systems’ (p. 223) , is plausible given
the divergence of species. If, on the other hand, you are more impressed by the
similarity between species, then the Brute Science thesis appears not  only much
less plausible, but  also profoundly conservative. But much of this is academic
anyhow. According to LaFollette and Shanks, ‘Animal experimentation is clearly
the central element in the current biomedical paradigm’ (p. 32) . This thesis is
handled in a completely reductionist way by LaFollette and Shanks, and such a
reductionism does not  serve their argument well. The biomedical paradigm, as 
I have presented it earlier, is vastly more sophisticated than that.
National University of Ireland, Galway Joseph Mahon
L udwig Wittgenstein: Cam bridge L etters
Edited by Brian McGuinness and Georg Henrik von Wright
Blackwell, 1995. Pp. viii + 349. ISBN 0–631–19015–5. £55.00.
Ludwig Wittgenstein was perhaps the most important philosopher of this century,
in spite of the fact that he wrote only two philosophical works during his entire
lifetime. His Tractatus L ogico-Philosophicus (1922)  heralded the linguistic turn of
twentieth-century analytic philosophy and inspired the logical positivists. H is
posthumously published Philosophical Investigations (1953)  was the major force
behind the conceptual analysis which dominated anglophone  philosophy until the
1970s, and continues to stimulate analytic and continental philosophers alike.
But in addition to these classics, Wittgenstein left behind an extensive Nachlass
– between 20,000 and 30,000 pages of manuscript and typescript. The material
ranges from  rst-draft notebooks and unstructured records of inspirations, to more
re ned statements he subsequently abandoned due to dissatisfaction with their
content or manner of representation. The Nachlass is essential to an understanding
of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, because it displays the constant development of his
thought, and because it is often more discursive and less compressed than the
frequently crypt ic passages of the Tractatus or the Philosophical Investigations.
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The size of the Nachlass shows that Wittgenstein was a prodigious writer with
an almost compulsive urge to record anything from arcane philosophical argu-
ments to personal observations and self-re ections. By comparison, the size of his
surviving correspondence is less impressive. A nd it is a fair conjecture that much
of the philosophically interesting material survived largely because Russell, Moore
and Keynes kept nearly all of Wittgenstein’s letters. Nevertheless, the letters to
and from Wittgenstein shed invaluable light on both his life and his philosophy.
For one thing, in his letters Wittgenstein often clari ed his thought in response
to queries. For another, the letters occasionally address intellectual issues that lie
beyond Wittgenstein’s strict philosophical concerns. Finally, they display his often
tumultuous relationships with those around him.
For this reason, the publication of L udwig Wittgenstein: Cam bridge L etters
is highly welcome. It takes the place of a previous volume, L etters to Russell,
Keynes and Moore (Blackwell, 1974) , in that it contains the correspondence
between Wittgenstein and those of his Cambridge friends who ‘can fairly be
regarded as his equals or even mentors rather than his disciples’ (p. 1). But 
it differs considerably from its predecessor. There are important additions, 
such as the inclusion of Ramsey and of Sraffa, a number of hitherto lost letters
from Wittgenstein to Russell, Keynes and Moore, and several letters to
Wittgenstein. The latter make for a genuine volume of correspondence, not least
because the reactions of his interlocutors are often as revealing as Wittgenstein’s
own. Furthermore, the letters are now arranged in a single chronological order.
Finally, the editorial work has been brought up to scratch. In addition to ortho-
graphic corrections, there are now more footnotes explaining points in the letters
which would otherwise be unintelligible to anyone unfamiliar with details of
Wittgenstein’s biography. The translations of the German material are by
McGuinness, and they are consistently good.
But while I can see no signi cant  aws in the editorial work, the editorial policy
invites complaint. As so often in the chequered history of the publication of
Wittgenstein’s work, the chance of providing an edition that is as comprehensive
and de nitive as possible has been missed. Instead, there is more of the drip-
feeding which has been a constant feature of the way in which Wittgenstein’s
Nachlass has been made accessible since the publication of The Blue and Brown
Book s in 1958.
Whether it would have been pro table to include correspondence with those
of Wittgenstein’s Cambridge friends who can fairly be regarded as his disciples
may be debatable. It is undebatable, however, that other items of correspondence
are highly important to an appreciation of Wittgenstein’s œuvre. The letters to
Ogden, the of cial translator of the Tractatus, not  only illuminate speci c passages,
but  also contain an important statement on the relationship between Wittgenstein’s
ideal notation and the ideal languages of Frege and R ussell. The letters from Frege
are important, if only because they con rm Wittgenstein’s complaint in a 
letter to Russell (p. 124)  that Frege had not  understood the Tractatus. The letters
to Paul Engelman and Ludwig von Ficker shed badly needed light on the other
side of the book, namely its excursions into mysticism; they contain the impor-
tant (if in my view highly misleading) claim that the essential point  of the Tractatus
is what it leaves unsaid, namely the ethical. Finally, the exchanges with Malcolm
reveal some of the philosophical and personal problems that occupied
Wittgenstein’s  nal years.
A ll of these items have been published. Moreover, the editors of the Cam bridge
L etters could plead that they stuck to their brief (non-disciple Cambridge friends).
Yet, the brief itself is unduly narrow, with the result that many of the aforementioned
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letters remain beyond easy access. This may not be the editors’ fault. It is notoriously
dif cult to get so many copyright holders to do the right thing, not to mention pub-
lishers. But it remains deplorable, all the more so since a more comprehensive edi-
tion of Wittgenstein’s correspondence already exists in German, namely Briefe
(Suhrkamp, 1980) . Let us hope, therefore, that the volume under review will be fol-
lowed by a second one which contains the rest of Wittgenstein’s important corre-
spondence, and in particular the letters from Frege which had not  yet been
discovered in 1980.
In spite of these strategic limitations, Wittgenstein scholars, other philosophers
and laypeople alike will pro t from Cam bridge L etters. As the Introduction
explains, it shows that, in spite of the occasional disparaging remark, Wittgenstein
was greatly attracted to the Cambridge that these friends represented. It also docu-
ments four quarrels and four reconciliations. ‘He appears here in turns shy and
affectionate,  erce and censorious, happy to collaborate and sure of his own judge-
ment’ (p. 2). One might add that he also appears incredibly rude and self-righteous.
The letter he wrote in response to Moore’s well-meaning attempt to inform him
of the regulations governing the Cambridge BA  (pp. 85–6) takes the biscuit in
this respect, but there are other examples (e.g. pp. 258–61, 311–13) .
Such letters con rm an impression from anecdotes (notably by Fannie Pascal
and Malcolm), namely that Wittgenstein was completely oblivious to the effect
that his outbursts – including those ostensibly directed against himself, such as 
his famous confession – might have on those around him. Throughout  his 
life, Wittgenstein struggled against the temptations of philosophical solipsism, a
position which Schopenhauer referred to as ‘theoretical egoism’. By the same
token, it is only mild hyperbole to characterize Wittgenstein’s attitude to others
as practical solipsism.
Why did people of the stature of Russell and Keynes put  up with him, at least
part of the time? Cam bridge L etters provides some clues to answer this question.
They display the effects of his charisma. First and foremost, however, they display
the development of his philosophical genius. In particular, they show how many
of his most important ideas came to him early and were then subjected to endless
revision and reformulation.
Thus his second letter to Russell in 1912 already contains the core of his entire
philosophy of logic: ‘there are NO logical constants’ and ‘Logic must turn out to
be of a TOTALLY different kind than any other science’ (pp. 14–15). The symbols
of logic (propositional connectives and quanti ers) are not names of logical enti-
ties (such as Frege’s functions or Russell’s logical objects), and hence the
propositions of logic, unlike those of other sciences, are not descriptions of some
kind of reality, whether physical, mental or abstract. The later and more famous
picture theory can be seen as simply providing the background for this idea: by
characterizing scienti c propositions as pictures of reality it throws into sharp relief
the special, non-depicting status of logical propositions.
In recent years, much has been made of Ramsey’s in uence on the middle
Wittgenstein. Unfortunately, the precise nature of this in uence is dif cult to pin
down, except where Wittgenstein himself alludes to it (e.g. Philosophical
Investigations §88) . In any event, Cam bridge L etters shows that, at least initially,
most of the traf c was in the other direction. Although Ramsey never allowed
this to dull his critical intelligence, he greatly admired Wittgenstein (see, e.g., note
on pp. 186–7 and pp. 196–8). Indeed, his main ambition was to reformulate the
logicism of Principia Mathematica in the light of the strictures of Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus.
One aspect of this project is documented in detail, namely the treatment of
identity (pp. 191, 194, 216–21). The Tractatus had repudiated Russell’s idea of
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identity as a relation in which each thing stands to itself: ‘to say of two things that
they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself
is to say nothing at all’. In an ideal notation, identity and difference of objects is
instead indicated by identity and difference of names (5.53ff.), a move which neces-
sitates a thorough modi cation of Russell’s theory of descriptions (for details, see
my A  Wittgenstein Dictionary (Blackwell, 1996, pp. 164–9)).
Ramsey accepted Wittgenstein’s criticism of Russell’s de nition of identity,
namely that it implies the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, i.e. that two
objects cannot  have all their qualities in common. Unfortunately, like Russell and
Wittgenstein he ignored the question of whether these qualities are to include
spatio-temporal location, which would make the principle plausible. At the same
time, R amsey tried to retain identity in a way which accommodates the Tractatus,
arguing in effect that true identity statements are tautologies and false ones contra-
dictions. He de ned ‘x 5 y’ through a two-place function Q (x, y) which is a logical
product of material equivalences: f1x ; f1y . f2x ; f2y ., etc. This yields a tautology
when x and y have the same value or meaning – f1a ; f1a . f2a ; f2a, etc. – but
otherwise a contradiction, because there will be a function fkx and two objects a
and b such that fka ; ~fkb. Wittgenstein replied that in the case of x and y having
different values, ‘a 5 b’ is not contradictory but nonsensical , and so is ‘a ± b’, since
the negation of a nonsense is a nonsense. To this Ramsey responded in effect that
his Q-function was not meant to be synonymou s with ‘5 ’, but only to perform an
equivalent role. The exchange nicely displays their contrasting and yet comple-
mentary philosophical talents: Ramsey tries to counter the paralysing effects of
Wittgenstein’s dialectic acumen through ingenious technical innovations.
Wittgenstein’s philosophical exchanges with Moore are of an entirely different
and less technical nature. Particularly interesting are his comments on Moore’s
paradox. Moore had observed that while we often do not  believe something which
is true, it is absurd to say ‘It is raining, but  I don’t believe it.’ Wittgenstein rejected
Moore’s suggestion that this absurdity is of a psychological nature. He claimed
that such utterances play a role similar to that of contradictions, and that the
paradox shows something about ‘the logic of assertion’ (pp. 315–17) . This remark 
anticipates the central bones of contention between contemporary Wittgensteinians
and their Gricean adversaries, namely whether the ‘semantic’, i.e. philosophically
relevant, features of language are con ned to those reckoned with by formal logic,
or whether they also include the other rules and practices highlighted by
Wittgenstein’s descriptions of our ‘language games’.
The single letter from the economist Sraffa (pp. 290–2) is interesting for a
different reason. Sraffa repeatedly calls it confused, but  it contains an immensely
acute analysis of Wittgenstein’s options in the light of the Nazi takeover of Austria.
One wonders what its author was capable of when he was less confused, and it
lends credence to Wittgenstein’s acknowledgements of Sraffa’s in uence in the
Preface of the Philosophical Investigations. Like the whole volume, it shows that
the intelligence and talents of Wittgenstein’s Cambridge friends made them all
the more capable of appreciating and supporting his own genius. This holds in
particular of Russell. The correspondence gives us a glimpse of what were perhaps
the most fascinating philosophical exchanges of this century. It also shows that in
spite of their later estrangement, the two were much closer in intellectual tempera-
ment than is commonly supposed.
University of Reading Hans-Johann Glock
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